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Summary  findings
Network externalities exist when the benefit a consumer  Kubota analyzes how the presence of network
derives from a good or service depends on the number of  externalities affects a country's  willingness to trade. In
other consumers using the same good or service (as  her model, governments decide whether or not to allow
happens, for example, with telecommunications,  international trade. When trading is permitted,  the
television broadcasting standards, and many other  superior standard drives out all others in the trading
technology-related goods and services).  area.
National monopolies, regulated and endorsed by  She shows that even when there are efficiency gains
sovereign governments, tended to produce network  from worldwide standardization, global free trade may
externalities in the past: most countries had telephone  not prevail. The technology leader is generally eager to
monopolies, often state-owned, before deregulation.  trade, but countries with less advanced technology often
Whether to allow foreign competition in such industries  choose to form inefficient regional blocs or not to trade
becomes a pressing issue when national boundaries begin  at all. Once such regional networks are established,
to blur as technology advances and as previously  global efficiency-enhancinig  free trade becomes even
untraded goods and services become tradable.  harder to achieve than it would have been in their
Despite obvious gains from trade in such newly  absence.
tradable sectors, governments often keep trade-  Transfer payments between countries reduce or
prohibiting measures. With analog high definition  eliminate such inefficiency and facilitate the achievement
television (HDTV) transmission standards, for example,  of efficient trade in products.
regulations and politics kept Europe and Japan from  To achieve mutually beneficial trade arrangements, it is
cooperating, so each invested heavily to develop its  important  to arrive at multilateral agreements before
system in an attempt  to have its own standard adopted  regional blocs form.
by the rest of the world.
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Network  externalities  are demand-side  economies  of scale,  which  make the benefit a consumer
derives  from a good or service  dependent on the number  of other consumers  purchasing  the
*Correspondence  should  be  sent  to  1818 H  Street,  NW,  Washingtcn,  DC  20433,  email:  kkub-
ota@worldbank.org. The views expressed in this paper are personal and s:aould  not be attributed  to the
World  Bank or its member  countries. I thank John McLaren,  Kyle Bagwell,  Ronald Findlay,  Giovanni  Maggi,
Anthony Venables,  Maurice  Schiff,  and participants  of the Development  Reseacch  Group Trade Seminar at the
World  Bank for useful comments  on earlier  draft.  All remaining  errors are mine.
1same item.  Telecommunications systems and television broadcasting standards  are good ex-
amples. In autarchy each country is likely to develop a single national standard,  which is often
not compatible with those used in foreign countries. The television standard  that  is used in
the  United States  and Japan  is NTSC, while much of Western Europe  uses PAL, and East-
ern  Europe  and  France use SECAM. This means that  a movie video purchased  in a  French
store cannot be played on an American video cassette recorder without  a converter. A single
global standard  best  takes advantage of network externalities  but the world is already frag-
mented with locked-in consumers and producers of multiple standards, endorsed and regulated
by national  governments.  Adopting a single standard  to  make all  but  one existing systems
completely obsolete will entail large adjustment  costs.  The drastic nature  of transition  may
cause politicians to be more concerned than  usual about producers of goods and services who
suddenly lose business with  the  adoption of a  new technology.  Conversely, if the  national
standard  is adopted  by the rest of the world, suppliers of associated goods and services stand
to gain a windfall. Therefore, governments deciding whether to liberalize their network-related
markets  face a  difficult trade-off of overall efficiency gains and a prospect  for acquiring new
markets on the one hand, and a possibility of incurring sizable adjustment costs on the other.
Whether to allow foreign systems to be introduced to the domestic market was not an issue
while national  boundaries were clear and sovereign governments had the  sole responsibility
for setting standards'.  Foreign electronics producers simply manufactured television sets that
were compatible with the system used in the destination market, and did not question whether
NTSC should be adopted in France. The situation began to change in the last decade or so with
the advancement of technology as well as government policies of deregulation and liberalization,
which made many previously untraded  goods and  services tradable.  Trade  in  goods and
services that  are subject  to network externalities  differs from that  in conventional goods in
a number  of ways.  For example,  barriers to  trade  generally take  the  form of prohibitions,
quantitative  restrictions,  and government regulations instead of import  tariffs.  In many such
sectors, liberalization tends not to be a gradual process since the equivalent of slowly phasing
out tariffs is not available: opening the domestic market to international  trade  is equivalent;
to  allowing foreign systems into the country, and  is an all-or-nothing decision.  This feature
makes trade  liberalization  in such sectors even more contentious  than  that  for conventional
goods.
In this paper, I analyze how the presence of network externalities affects a country's willing-
ness to trade when international trade  involves a potential switching of the national standard
For the purpose of this paper, trading is synonymous with having a common standard.  I show
that  even when there are efficiency  gains from adopting a worldwide standard,  global free trade
may not prevail. The technology leader is usually eager to engage in free trade  but countries
with less advanced technology have more complicated welfare analyses to make. In particular,
laggard  countries may prefer forming a regional bloc among themselves to  global free trade
in order to protect  its own national champion from competition, prevent  a foreign firm from
exercising monopoly power over its economy, or avoid paying adjustment  costs.  Once a re-
gional standardization  occurs, the sheer size of the consumer base can give the regional bloc
a market power that  leads to an inefficient outcome. When countries are not free to pick and
choose trading partners,  which is the case under the Most Favored Nation principle of WTO,
'Although there were a few notable exceptions such as Motorola's attempt  to introduce the American system
for the analogue mobile phone to Japanese market,  where an incompatible  standard  was used.
2however, they may be persuaded to agree to free trade even when a regional bloc is their most
preferred option.  This paper  finds regionalism insidious, and  uncterscores the importance  of
multilateral  trade  arrangements.
This paper is reLated  to two distinct strands in the economics  literature.  First,  it fits in the
long tradition of regional versus multilateral trade literature.  This literature is divided into two
camps, one that considers regionalism to be harmful (McLaren 199.9;  Bhagwati and Panagariya
1996, Levy :1997;  to  list a few), and the other  that  thinks it is a step  in the  right  direction
(Kemp and 'Wan 1976; Summers 1991; Baldwin 1995; Ethier  1998; among many others).  This
paper  is in the first  group, and  argues that  formation of regional blocs alters the  incentive
structure  of participating countries in a way that makes free trade  more difficult to achieve. I
discuss whether forming a particular trading coalition is in the interest of member states, which
is similar in spirit to works by Riezman (1985) and Bur idge  et al.  (1997). Second, the basic
idea of the paper  is related to the industrial organization literature  on network externalities
(Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1986, 1994; Farrell and Saloner 1986; Bensen and Farrell 1994). This
literature examines how technology standards are adopted within a domestic market when the
good or service in question is subject to network externalities. The difference  between a purely
domestic and.  international  set up is that the number and the type of competitors that  exist are
controlled by governments which have different objectives from firms.  This paper focuses on
the government's decision problem in trade negotiations, and does not address the subtle issues
related to arrivals of new technologies or the mechanism with which standards  are adopted  in
the domestic market.. Network externalities have not been studied  extensively in the context
of international  trade.  One of the few exceptions is a paper by Bhattari  and Whalley (1998),
which estimates  gains from trade liberalization in a computer simulated model and finds that
gains accrue approximately equally to large and small countries. In an insightful overview  book,
Sykes (1995) discusses issues related to product standards for internationally integrated goods.
He makes a distinction between a product standard and a,  regulation: compliance with the first
is voluntary, and with the second is mandatory.  He then suggests when government fiat may be
appropriate and when market solution is sufficient. In this paper, ][  use the terms technology,
network, and standard  interchangeably, and  all of them  are essent-ially  regulations  in Sykes'
terminology.  This paper is much narrower in scope thaa  his book  and aims to  demonstrate
theoretical reasons why governments may  "regulate" foieign producers out of their markets.
Gandal  and  Shy (2000 forthcoming)  make another  important  and  related  contribution.  In
their model based on Salop's circular country, all domestic and foreign brands (standards)  are
tradable regardless ol governments' decision. What  the governments determine is whether to
"recognize" foreign brands  or not, which influences the price and hence the attractiveness  of
foreign brands.  In contrast, this paper makes the consequences  of governments' decisions more
drastic:  when governments agree to trade,  only one standard  survives in the entire  trading
area due to network externalities.  I examine governments' willingness to trade  when trading is
a all-or-nothing proposition whereas they study whether governments have strategic incentives
to erect barriers that  are merely trade-reducing.
In the  next  section,  I outline  a model of trade  negotiations  in the  presence of network
externalities.  I explore two alternative specifications of gDvernment's objective finction  using
the  same basic set  up:  in the  first specification, the  government is benign  and  maximizes
consumer welfare; the second specification makes the government more concerned about  the
national monopoly than consumers. I use the concept of the core adapted from Riezman (1985)
3to  analyze which trade  arrangement  emerges as a result  of trade  negotiations.  Concluding
remarks follow.
2  The  Model
This model of trade negotiations in the presence of network externalities is adapted from Katz
and Shapiro (1986). 1 use the core solution concept applied to coalitional choice proposed by
Riezman (1985).  There  are three  countries, S,  E,  and  W.  They have distinct  technologies
but  are otherwise symmetric.  There are two time periods,  t  =  1, 2.  There is homogeneous
population, N, in each country and both periods. Consumers have completely inelastic demand
for one unit of service, priced pt, where i E {S, E, W}  denotes the country or its technology.
Let  S  be the  technology leader and  most efficient.  The utility  consumers derive from the
service is determined by how many others are in the same network (consume the same service')
in the same period.  The net utility of a typical consumer who belongs to network i, in periocd
t is:
v(n)  -pt
where n is the number of people consuming i in the same period anywhere in the world, and
v(.) is a concave and increasing function. It  is simple to show that  even when there are more
than one choice of networks available, all consumers will pick the same one. Suppose there are
two networks, A and B, priced PA and PB, used by nA and nB consumers respectively. Then
it must be the case that  no consumer purchasing that  technology wants to switch to the other
technology. For technology A, this condition is
v(nA)-PA  > v(nB  + 1)-PB  (1)
For technology B, this condition is
v(nB)  -PB  > V(nA + 1) -PA  (2)
Given that  v(.)  is an increasing function  and that  individuals  have a unit  mass,  these two
conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Therefore, whenever more than one networks a-e
available, all consumers choose the same one. Katz and Shapiro (1986) call this a  bandwagor.
result. In the first period,  all countries are in autarchy and consumers use their own country's
technology:
v(N)  -p1
Before entering  the second period,  the countries have an option of opening their markets  to
trade.  `Itading arrangements  are  "unanticipated  events" in the sense that  consumers made
the network choice in the first period without  regard to the  prospects of trade  negotiations.
The government chooses the trade  regime (autarchy, regional bloc, or free trade)  to maximize
its objective function.  Inter-country  transfers  are ruled out unless otherwise noted.  By the
bandwagon  result discussed above, a single standard will prevail within a trading area. I assume
that  consumers choose the network from all available options instantaneously. In reality, there
will obviously be a transitional  period, during which some loss of consumer welfare is likely to
occur. Taking this possibility into account will decrease the gains from trade  but will not alter
4the fundamental  results. In each of the cases discussed below, I assume that  N- is sufficiently
large so that  the price difference  offered by the leader and a laggard in equilibrium is such that
plaggard  _  pleader  >  v(N  + 1) - v(N)
That  is, the  price difference between networks is relatively large  compared to  the marginal
benefit  of an  additional  person  in the  network around  N  so that  when the  leader  and  a
laggard begin trading,  consumers choose the lower priced (i.e., better  quality for the purpose
of this pape:r) technology 2. There is uncertainty  about  which network prevails only when the
two (or more) available technologies are identical (priced the same).
Let  trading countries be denoted by a curly bracket.  There are five possible trading ar-
rangements:
1. A: {S}  {E;} {W}
2. RB(EW):  {E,W}  {S}
3. RB(W'S):  {W SI  {E}
4. RB(SE):  {S,E}  {W}
5. FT:  {S,E,W}
All countries remain in autarchy  in trading  arrangement  A, regional blocs form in  2 to
4 (written  RB  with trading countries in the parenthesis),  and free trade  emerges in number
5 (marked FT  for free trade).  Denote the welfare of country i under  trading arrangement  j
as VO(j). Countries use the utility level associated with each trading arrangement to evaluate
coalitions.  The welfare associated with one country coalition, for example {fS}, is the same
regardless of what the other countries do: that  is, Vs (A'  = Vs(RB  (EW)).  Trade negotiations
are  modeled as  a coalition  forming game,  and  its outcome  as elements in  the  core.  The
definition ol the core is the following.
Definition  A trading arrangement j is in the core if ilt  is unblocked by any possible coalition.
A coalition L blocks arrangement j if, for all i E L,
Vi (L) > V'i()
with strict  inequality for at least one member of L.
I discuss two alternative objective functions that negotiating governments use to evaluate their
options.  First,  the governments maximize their own citizens' utility.  There  are adjustment
costs involved in switching networks. Next, I analyze a case where each government optimizes
2The consamers'  technology  choice problem  has multiple  eqLiilibria. For  example,  many  consumers  who
were in the  "leader" network can  choose to switch to the  "laggard"  network for some reason.  If the expanded
consumer base of the  "laggard" network constitutes  a critical mass, then, by the bandwagon result,  all consumers
will flock to the  "laggard"  network.  This possibility of convergence to an inferior equilibrium has been studied
extensively in the 1O literature,  and is not the main focus of this paper.  Therefore,  I assume that  consumers
choose the superior  technology:  that  is, the focal equilibrium prevails.
5a weighted average of the national monopolist's profits and consumers' utility.  I assume there
are no adjustment costs under the second scenario, but that  the monopolists sank set up costs
in period 1. In the benchmark case under both sets of specifications, the government chooses
trading  partners,  consumers decide which technology to use, and  inter-country  transfers  are
ruled out. Then, I discuss how the outcome would change if inter-country transfers are allowed.
2.1  Costly  switching
In this section I  assume there  is a fixed adjustment  cost K  for a country to switch to a new
technology.  This could be thought of as one-time unemployment benefits or retraining  costs
for workers whose expertise becomes obsolete with scrapping of the  current network.  I also
assume the prices are fixed exogenously, for example, regulated to  equal the  marginal costs,
at p2, pw, and p2  respectively. I discuss the pricing strategies of monopolists in the following
section.  Technological  merits are summarized by the marginal costs: the technological leader S
has the lowest costs, and the laggards have higher and identical costs (pA < P2  =  P2B)  Since
the focus of the  analysis is entirely on the second period, I drop the time subscript hereafter
for brevity unless it is confusing to do so.  The government decides whether to  allow foreign
technologies into the  market, and  by implication,  to accept the  possibility of having to pay
the  adjustment  cost, which is raised through  a lump-sum tax of k  =A  from all citizens in
the  country if switching takes place.  All consumers will voluntarily choose the  same (least;
expensive) technology from available choices by the  bandwagon  result discussed above. Whern
networks have the same technological merit  (i.e., the same price), either  is chosen with equaL
probability.  When there  is uncertainty  about  which network will be adopted  in the trading
bloc, the ex-ante and ex-post welfare are different. I assume that  countries are risk-neutral.
I discuss global efficiency  and the choices of national governments in turn.  Each subsection
is followed by a summarizing proposition.  Figures that  illustrate the propositions with curves
marked by the corresponding equation numbers in the text are in the appendix.
2.1.1  Global  efficiency
Global efficiency  depends on the concavity of v(.) and magnitudes of parameter values. Denote
global welfare associated with the trading arrangement j as VG(j):
VG(FT)  =  3N[v(3N)  - ps]  - 2K
In a free trade  equilibrium, every individual in the world derives utility v(3N)  since all 31
people are in network S.  Each pays ps, and the net utility is multiplied by the world populatiorL
3N.  Since W and E  switch to network S, both pay the adjustment  cost K.
Welfare under  outcomes RB(WS)  and RB(SE)  yield:
VG(RB(WS))  = VG(RB(SE))  = 2N[v(2N)  - ps]  - K  + N[v(N)  - PE]
Here, two countries,  W  and  S or S  and  E,  have formed  a regional  bloc,  and  thus,  their
citizens enjoy a network with 2N people.  Net utility of each individual in the regional bklc
is v(2N)  - pS since S is adopted, and there  are 2N people who enjoy this level of net utility.
The laggard country  (either W  or E) pays K.  Since these are regional bloc outcomes, one
6country is left in autarchy.  Its citizens have a small netwrork  with each individual deriving net
utility of v(N)  - PE  (or v(N)  - pW) but this country does not pay the adjustment  cost K.
Global welfare under a regional bloc between the laggards is analogous:
VG(RB(EW))  = 2N[v(2N)  - PE] - K + N[v(N{) - ps]
This regional bloc is always less efficient than those involving the leader because more people
pay the higher laggard price in RB(EW)  than  in either RB(WS)  or RPB(SE).
Global net welfare under autarchy  is:
VG(A) = 3Nv(N)-N  P  N
iG{S,E,W}
where each individual in country i attains  net utility of v(N)  - pi.
Now I am ready to compare the global welfare under different trading arrangements.  In-
tuitively, global efficiency depends on how large network benefits are (the curvature of v(.)),
what the leader and laggard price difference  is (pE - pS  = Ap), and how large the adjustment
cost is (K).  FRee  trade  is more efficient than regional blocs WS and SE  when the following
inequality holds:
VG(FT)  - VG(RB(WS))  = VG(FT)  - VG(RB(SE))
=  N{3[v(3N) - v(2N)] + [v(2N) - v(V)] + Ap}  - K  > 0  (3)
Regional blocs involving S are more efficient than  autarchy when:
VG(RB(WS))  - VG(A) = VG(RB(SE))  - VG(A)
= N{2[v(2N)  - v(N)] + Ap]  - K  > 0  (4)
And finally, free trade is more efficient than  autarchy when:
Vc"  (FT)  - VG(A) = NJ 2[v(3N)  - v(N)] + Ap}  - K > 0  (5)
Thus, the parameter space can be divided into three regions according to global efficiency. This
result is depicted in figure  1, and is summarized in the following proposition.  In all figures,
additional network benefits an individual receives when ais country moves from autarchy  to a
regional bloc is normalized to unity (v(2N) - v(N)  = 1), incremental benefits of moving from
a regional bloc to free trade, v(3N)  -v(2N),  is on the vertical axis, and the adjustment cost in
per capita terms,  K,  is on the horizontal axis. The area maarked  FT  is where free trade is most
efficient. The small triangle region marked RB  is where the outcome RB(WS)  or RB(SE)
is efficient. When a third  country in the network adds significant benefits to  a regional bloc
(v(3N)  - v(2N)  > 3[v(2N) - v(N)]),  regional blocs are never efficient. Autarchy  is efficient
in the remaining parameter  space, marked A.
Proposition  1  iFor  given v(.), N,  and Ap, there exists a pair of cutoff levels (Kft,  Krb)  such
that free trade is efficient for all K  E [0,  Kft],  regional bloc is efficient in K  E [Kft,Krb],  and
autarchy the most efficient for K  > Krb. For some parameter values, Kft  = Krb  (regional bloc
is never efficientj).
72.1.2  National  Governments
National  governments  do  not  take  welfare  of other  countries  into  account.  For  this  reason,
global  efficiency and  the  actual  outcome  do not  always  coincide.  The  two technology  laggards
have  an  identical  optimization  problem,  while  the  leader  has  a  different  set  of  incentives.  I
now discuss  national  government's  optimization  problem.
Technology  leader  Government  S compares  the  welfare under  three  different  trade  regimes.
Free  trade  yields:
VS(FT)  = N[ v(3N)  - ps]
The  leader  leaps  the  benefits  of an  expanded  network  while not  paying  any  of the  adjustment
cost  by the  virtue  of having  a superior  technology.  Forming  a regional  bloc  with  either  partner
gives S:
VS(RB(WS))  = VS(RB(SE))  = N[v(2N)  -pS]
Again,  its  trading  partner  always  pays  the  adjustment  cost,  while  citizens  of  S  enjoy  the
expanded  network.  If S stays  in autarchy,  the  welfare  is:
Vs(A)  = Vs  (RB(EW))  = N[v(N)  - ps]
Thus,  the  technology  leader  is always eager to trade  because  it receives the  benefits  of expanded
network  without  ever having  to pay  the  adjustment  cost  whenever  it engages  in trade:
VS(FT)  > VS(RB(WS))  =  VS(RB(SE))  >  Vs(A)  =  VS(RB(EW))
Technology  laggards  Government  E  (W)  chooses the  trade  regime by analyzing  its  options.
In  a free trade  equilibrium,  welfare  of E  is:
VE(FT)  = N[v(3N)  _pS]  - K
Citizens  of  E  always  switch  to  network  S,  and  thus,  must  pay  the  adjustment  cost.  The
consumers  enjoy  a  lower price  as well as expanded  network.
A regional  bloc  with  the  leader  yields:
VE(RB(SE))  = N[v(2N)  -pS]  - K
whereas  a  bloc  with  the  fellow laggard  gives them  an  expected utility  of:
Expected  VE(RB(EW))  = N[v(2N)  - p]-  K
where  i E {E, W}  As discussed  above,  the  ex-ante  welfare is different  from  the  ex-post  welfaxe
in  the  case  of  a  regional  bloc  between  E  and  W  because  there  is uncertainty  about  which
network  will be adopted  in the  trading  bloc:  country  E  is expected  to pay  the  adjustment  cost
only half  of the  time.  In  autarchy,  its  welfare  is:
VE(A)  = VE (RB(WS))  = N[v(N)  -p]
8In this case, E  foregoes the benefits of expanded networkc  but does not have to pay the adjust-
ment cost.
Government E's  trade policy can be determined by comparing welfare under different trade
regimes.  A quick inspection shows that free trade is always welfare-superior to a regional bloc
with S since the adjustment  cost must be paid in both  cases, while the network benefits are
higher in free trade  than  in a regional bloc.  Free trade  is also weakly better  than  a regional
bloc with W if:
V'"(FT)  - VE(RB(EW))  =  2N{v(3N)  -- v(2N)  + Ap}  -K  >  0  (6)
and weakly preferred to autarchy  if:
VE(FT)  - VE(A)  =  N{v(3N)  - v(.V)  +  Ap}  - K  > 0  (7)
Outcome RF3(E1V) is weakly preferred to A when:
V-E(RB(EW))  - VE(A)  =  N{v(2N)  - v(N)}  - K  > °  (8)
These results indicate that  technology laggards tend  tc  trade  less than  global efficiency calls
for either by choosing autarchy excessively  or by formiing  an inefficient regional bloc between
themselves.  This is because the adjustment costs fall exclusively on laggards when they trade
with  the  leader  whereas when they  trade  with one otlher, the  costs  are shouldered evenly
ex-ante.  Figures  :2a and 2b  illustrate  these results.  Figure  2a  depicts  the  case where
the network benefits are relatively large compared to the price difference between the leader
and  laggards  (Ap  <  v(2N)  - v(N)).  The  area  marked  RB(EW)  is the  paramreter  space  for
which the  inefficient regional bloc EW  forms.  In figure  2b, the  price difference outweighs
the  additional  network benefits of moving from autarchy  to a  regional bloc.  In this  case,
inefficient regional bloc never forms.  In either  case, the  efficient regional bloc RB(WS)  or
RB (SE)  never forms, and all countries tend to end up Excessively  in autarchy3. The following
proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition  2  Even when  it is globally most efficient to have  free trade  (K  E  [0,  Kft]),  there
exists  a  range  of  K  such  that  an  inefficient  regional  bloc  (outcome  RB(EW))  or  autarchy
is  the  unique  element  of  the  core.  Outcome  RB(EW)  can  be an  element  of  the  core  only  if
v(2N)  - v(N)  >  Ap.  Regional  blocs RB(WS)  and RB(SE)  newer form  even  when  they  are
efficient.
If the two technological laggards have already formed a regional bloc prior to considering
trading with S, free trade is even less attractive  to them than in a case where they are weighing
the options in autarchy.  This is because welfare in status quo:
v(2N) - p
t
30n  the  boundary  that  divides  the  parameter  space  between  FT  and  RB,  and  the  one  that  separates  FT
and  A  ((6)  for  K/NV  < 2  and  (7)  for  K/N  > 2),  free  trade  is the  unique  eleraent  of the  core  because  laggards
are  indifferent,  and. the  leader  strictly  prefers  free  trade.  On  the: boundary  (8)  for  v(3N)  - v(2N)  <  1 - Ap,
both  A and  RB(E'W)  are  elements  of the  core  since  E  and  W  ale  indifferent  between  the  two  outcomes.
9i E {E,  W}  is higher than it is under autarchy, and one of them has already sunk the switching
cost. In order for free trade  to be in the core 4, K  must satisfy:
K/N  < [v(3N) - v(2N)]  - Ap  (9)
This  result is depicted in figure  3.  The area in which the governments of E  and  W prefer
regional bloc to free trade, marked RB(EW),  is much larger than  before the regional bloc EW
was formed (the cutoff is now (9) instead of (6)). This regional bloc is insidious in the sense
that  it makes the efficient free trade outcome more difficult to achieve.
2.1.3  Allowing  inter-country  transfer  payments
In the  analysis above, there  are parameter  values for which outcome A or RB(EW)  is the
unique  element  of the  core even when it  is inefficient.  In particular,  the  leader  tends  to
be left in autarchy  excessively. In this section, I show that  inter-country  transfer  payments
can reduce these inefficiencies. If the price difference between the laggards and  the leader is
large relative  to  the  marginal network benefits of moving from autarchy  to  a regional bloc
(v(2N)  - v(N)  < Ap), that  is, if the parameter  space where RB(EW)  is the unique element
of the core does not exist,  then,  inefficiencies are eliminated completely.  Inefficiencies arise
in the laissez-faire equilibrium because the leader does not share the costs of standardization,
and therefore is a less attractive  trading  partner  than  its technological merit warrants.  The
outcome is more likely to  be efficient when S bears  a part  of switching costs in the  form of
transfer payments.  Transfers will always  be from the leader to the laggard(s) because payments
by laggards will only exacerbate the existing distortion.
Let bFT and  bRB be the  amount  of transfer the  leader is willing to pay  to bring about
free trade  and  a regional bloc respectively, and tFT(each) and  tRB be the  amount  that  will
convince  the laggards to participate  in free trade and regional bloc. The results are summarized
in proposition 3, and are illustrated  in figure  4.
Case  1.  Parameter  space  where  laggards  choose  autarchy  in  no  transfer  case:  In
order to convince both  countries to trade, the leader is willing to pay up to:
bFT < VS(FT)  - Vs(A)  = N[v(3N)  - v(N)]  (10)
where V,5(.) continues to denote country S's welfare before transfer payments.  This inequality
says the  transfer payments must not be larger than  the difference in welfare between partic-
ipating in free trade  and being in autarchy.  Government of E  (W)  agrees to free trade  if it
receives:
tFT  > VE(A)  - VE(FT)  = K  - Nfv(3N)  - v(N) + Ap}  (11)
That  is, if  the  transfer  compensates for the  adjustment  cost net  of the  increased networkc
benefits  and  the  reduced price.  Transfer payments can bring about  free trade  only if the
amount that  the leader is willing to pay is larger than  or equal to the sum of amounts the two
laggards  require:
2tFT <bFT  b  K/N  < 2  [v(3N) - v(N)] +  -Ap  (12)
4Free trade  is the  unique  element  of the  core when  (9) holds with equality  because  the  laggards  are just
indifferent and the leader strictly  prefers free trade.
10The equilibiium payment bFT*  is the smallest bFT  that  satisfies (1.2).
To convince E  ('W) to form a regional bloc, S is willing to pay up to:
bRB < VS(RB(SE))  - Vs(A)  = NT[v(2N)  - v(N)I  (13)
Country E  (W)  agrees if it receives:
tB:>  VE(A) - VE(RB(SE))  = K  - N{v(2N)  - v(N)  + Ap}  (14)
For the regional bloc SE  of WS  to be in the core, the transfer payments the leader is willing
to make must be larger than  what are required for one Df the laggards to agree to trade:
tRB  < bRB  X  K/N  < 2[v(2N) -- v(N)] + Ap  (15)
The  equilibrium payment  bRB*  is the  smallest bRB  that  satisfies (15).  The  leader prefers
transfer inclusive free trade to a transfer inclusive regional bloc when:
VS(FT)  - bFT* > VS(RB)  - bRB*
X  K/N  < 3[v(3N) - v(2N)] + [v(2N) - v(N)] + Ap  (16)
Case  2.  Region  in which  laggards  choose  RB(EW)  if  no  transfer  is permitted:
This situation, which only happens if additional network benefits of moving frcm autarchy to
a  regional bloc is large relative to the  price difference between the  laggards and  the leader
(v(2N)  - v(N)  >  Ap),  is more complicated than  the first case.  The maximulm  transfer  the
leader  is willing to  make to trade  with both  countries and with  one of them  are the  same
as (10) and  (13) respectively.  In order for laggards to prefer free trade  to  the regional bloc
between them, each needs a transfer of:
V"9(FT) + tFT  > VE(RB(EW))  X  tFT > K  - N{v(3T)  - v(2N)  + Ap}  (17)
Free trade  is in t:he core only if the transfers the leader is willing to make are larger than  what
are required for the laggards to agree to trade:
bFT > 2tFT X  K < N{3[v(3N)  - v(2N)] H-  [v(2N) - v(N)3  + 2Ap}  (18)
The leader weakly prefers free trade  to regional blocs if transfer inclusive welfare of free trade
is higher than  that  of a regional bloc:
V"'(FT)  - bFT  >  VS(RB(SE))  - bRB X  bFT  - bRB < IV[v(3N) - v(2N)]  (19)
One of the laggards agrees to form a regional bloc with S if the transfer satisfies:
tRB  > VE(RB(EW))  - VE(RB(SE))  =  --  NAp  (20)
Substituting the smallest values that satisfy the inequalii:ies  (20) and (17) in (19), the condition
for the leader to wealy  prefer free trade  to regional bloc, both with transfers, is:
Vsi'FT)  - bFT*  > Vs(RB(SE))  - bRB*  K/.VN  < 6[v(3V)  - v(2N)1 + 2Ap  (21)
11The leader prefers a regional bloc with transfer to autarchy when:
VS(RB(SE))  - bRB* >  VS(A)  X  b  RB*  < N[v(2N)  - v(N)]  (22)
A regional bloc between E  (or W) and S is in the core only if:
bRB*>  tRB*  X  K  < v(2N)  - v(N)  + Ap  (23)
In the parameter  space where the inequality  (23) holds but  (21) does not, which is the blank
triangle area below line (21) and to the left of K/N  = 2 in figure 45, RB(SE)  and RB(WS)
appear to be the  elements of the core.  However, this  is not the  case.  Country W is left in
autarchy  when regional bloc SE  forms, which makes it wilLing  to accept  a smaller transfer
than  E  to become S's trading partner,  as long as it is better  off than  in autarchy.  The leader
is better  off trading  with a  partner  that  requires a  smaller transfer.  The two laggards will
bid down the transfers  in order to  avoid being left in autarchy.  A transfer  that  makes W
(or E)  marginally  better  off than  in autarchy, however, will leave both  E  and  W worse off
than  in outcome RB(EW).  Therefore, the core is empty in the parameter  space below (21)
and  to  the  left of K/N  =  2.  It  is interesting to  note  that  countries engage in  free trade
excessively  in the  area above (21), below (16), and to the left of K/N  = 2. This is because S
prefers to pay inefficiently  large transfers to E  and W in order to avoid being left in autarchy.
In the parameter  space where an inefficient regional bloc between the  laggards  (RB(EW))
would have formed, the change in the dynamics of trade negotiations caused by inter-country
transfers  creates instability that  makes the outcome unpredictable in some cases. The surplus
from transfer-induced trade  accrues exclusively to the leader since the laggards are paid just
enough to be indifferent between trading with S and not.  The results are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition  3  Inefficiency  is  reduced  when  inter-country  transfers  are  allowed.  Transfers
are  always  made,from  the  leader to laggard(s).  In  the parameter  space where  RB(EW)  is  an
element  of core when  such  transfers  are not  allowed, inefficiency  remains  because efforts  by aU
three  countries  to  avoid  getting  left  out  of the  regional  bloc introduce  competitive  instability.
If  the parameter  values  are such  that RB(EW)  is never  an element  of the  core,  inter-country
transfers  eliminate  all inefficiencies.  Gains from  transfer-induced  trade  accrue  exclusively  to
the  leader  (transfer  giver).
2.2  Defending  the  national  monopoly
Now suppose the  government cares about  both  the  national  monopoly profits  and  its  con-
sumers' welfare.  In this section, I assume there are no adjustment costs involved in switching
technologies but instead,  there is a fixed (sunk) cost F  (common for all technologies) to start
up a new network. At  first, I examine the case where no inter-country transfer  payments are
allowed. The constant  marginal cost MCI,  i = {S, E, W},  differs depending on the location
of the firm.  Let S, the technology leader, have the lowest marginal cost and the two laggards
have the same production  costs. Assume further that  the magnitude of the fixed cost is such
5 Only  k E  (2 (pE  - ps),  2] is relevant  for  case  2.
12that  the average cost of producing 3N units in S is larger than  the marginal costs in E  and
W:
MCS  < MCW  = MCE < ACS(3N)  =MC'+  F
3N
Another important  difference from the previous section is that  firms in this section price
their services stlrategically.  Each network is assumed to be proprietary  but entrepreneurs are
free to launch aL  new network, and therefore, national monopolies make expected zero profits
under  autarchy.  IrL  other words, monopolies engage in limit-pricing because the markets are
contestable. Under these specifications, it is globally efficient  to allow the least cost producer
to service l;he  entire world.
At the beginning of the second period, the government is (unexpectedly, as before) given
a  chance to  trade  with  other countries, and makes a decision by maximizing the weighted
average of producer and consumer surpluses:
max.  (1 -/3)(producer  surplz.s)  + /3N[v(n) - pi]
trade  regtmne
where  :3 E  (0,  ) is the  welfare weight on  consumer  36 and  i  Ei {S, E, W}.  When foreign
technologies become available, all consumers in the  t:rading area choose the least expensive
network by  the bandwagon result as before 7. As beFore, I assume there  is no  transitional
welfare loss for simplicity.
Technology  leader  Welfare of country S under autarchy is:
Vs(A)  -=  VS(RB(EW))  = (1 - /3)N[ACS(N)  -- MCs]  + /3Nv(N)  -ACS(N)j
The  first expression on  the  right-hand-side is the  rmonopolist's surplus,  multiplied by  the
welfare weight, 1 -- 3.  Since the market is contestable, the monopolist prices at  its average
cost, makes per unit  surplus equal to the difference between its average and marginal costs,
sells to N  citizens of S, and receives the total  surplus equivalent to the initial set up cost F
(F = N[ACS(N)  -- MCS]).  The second expression is l3he  aggregate net consuimer  utility with
the  welfare  weight  /3.
Forming a regional bloc brings an incumbent competitor.  The monopolists in S and its
trading partner  are now a duopoly in the regional blec, and they engage in a Bertrand  com-
petition.  Since ex-monopolist S is a lower cost producer, it wins the market  by pricing at  (a
shade below) its competitor's marginal cost:
VS(RB(SE))  = VS(RB(WS))  =  (1-  0)2N(M&  - MCO 5)  + /N[v(2N)  - MCOl
i  E {E, W}.  Ex-monopolist S's  surplus per  unit  of sale shrinks from ACS(N)  - MCS  to
MCi-  M-CS,  but the sales are twice as many now.  Denote the difference in marginal costs
61t is no-t customary  to assume  a lower weight  on consumers than  on the  monopoly  in. the  industrial  or-
ganization  literature  but  is more common in the  political economy literature.  Eminent  predecessors,  such as
Grossman and Helprman (1992) have made use of it, and I believe it is a realistic assumption  for governments
that  are paiticipating  in WTO negotiations.
7As discussed in the previous section, I assume that  consumers will choose the  "focal" equilibrium.
13between laggards and the leader as AC  (= MC  - MCS).  This AC is the per unit surplus
for producer S when the country trades.  The consumers enjoy an expanded network as well
as a lower price.
In the case of free trade, three incumbents play a Bertrand  game, and S's welfare is:
VS(FT)  = N{(1  - 0)3AC  +  3[v(3N) - MC']}
Country S's preference is depicted in figure 5. The technology leader always  prefers free trade
to regional blocs. This is because the producer surplus per unit,  AC, is the same in both  free
trade  and regional blocs but the increase in sales and the benefits from network externalities
are larger in free trade than  in regional blocs. The leader weakly prefers free trade to autarchy
if and only if:
VS(FT)  - VS(A)  = N[v(3N)  - v(N)  +  3  AC]  - 1-  23  F > 0  (24)
That is, if the benefits of network externalities and increased sales volume outweigh the price
reduction the monopoly must take.
Technology  laggards  Welfare of country E  (W)  under autarchy  is:
VE(A)  = VE(RB(WS))  = (1-  3)N(ACE(N)  - MCE)  +  3N[v(N)  - ACE(N)]
This is analogous to technology leader S's.
The welfare of laggards is different from that  of the leader when they trade  because the
monopolist in E  (W)  cannot generate positive producer surplus under trade  unlike its coun-
terpart  in S, which just  suffers a reduction of surplus per unit.  Even when monopolist E  (W)
wins the market, as it may do when trading with the fellow  laggard, it still makes zero surplus
since the competitor is a same cost producer.  A regional bloc with either partner gives E  (W)
the welfare of:
VE(RB(EW))  = VE(RB(SE))  =/3N[v(2N)  - MCE]
The welfare under free trade  is:
VE (FT)  = /N[v(3N)  - MCE]
Country E weakly prefers free trade to autarchy if and only if:
VE (FT) _  VE  ~~~1  -2/3 VE(FT)  - VE(A)  =  N[v(3N)  - v(N)]  - F > 0  (25)
which  is the  area  marked  FT  on  and  to  the  left  of  line  (25)  in  figure  6.  Note  that  this
participation  constraint  is harder  to satisfy  than  S's  constraint  (24).  Country  E  will participate
in free trade  if network  externalities  are relatively  large compared  to the  fixed costs.  It  always
prefers  free  trade  to  regional  blocs  since  its  own  monopolist  will not  make  any  surplus  in
either  case,  and  benefits  from  network  externalities  are  larger  in free  trade  than  in  regional
blocs.  Free  trade  is the  unique  element  of the  core  on  the  boundary  (25) since  the  laggards
are  indifferent  and  the  leader  strictly  prefers  free trade.
14Proposition  4  When  the  markets  are  contestable  and  the  government  is  maximizing  the
weighted  average  of  producer  and  consumer  surpluses,  regional  blocs are  never  elements  of
the  core.  There  exists  a parameter  space where  the lead,er wants free trade  but laggards choose
autarchy,  and hence,  autarchy  is the  outcome.
2.2.1  A  variation:  duopoly  collusion
So far, the results indicate that govermnents  choose free trade over regional blocs if they decide
to trade  at all. Now suppose that in the case of a regional bloc between the two laggards, their
national monopolies form a cartel (or merge), set the price pc above their marginal costs, and
split the market.  I'he  maximum the  cartel can charge is pc =  AC(2N)  >  rCcE =  MCW
since a higher price will attract  new entrants.  The welfare of each country under such a cartel
is:
VE (Cartel)  =  (1 -,3)N(pC  - MCE)  + ,3N[v(2N)  - pC]
Each member of the cartel makes producer surplus of AN(pc - MCE)  = F/2.  This seems to be
a realistic depiction of the world: faced with a tough competitor, two technological laggards
join forces in defending their national monopolies. Such a regiona. bloc is weakly preferred to
free trade when:
VE(Cartel)  - VE(FT)  =  2/3  - NI[v(3N) - v(2N)]  > 0  (26)
That is, when the fixed costs are relatively large compared to netvrork benefits, the preference
of E and  W4 between regional bloc and free trade reverses from the benchmark case discussed
above. The triangle to the left of the line numbered (25) and to the right of (26) in figure  7
depicts the parameter  space in which the inefficient cartel deters free trade.  EBoth  E  and W
always prefer a cartel between them to a regional bloc with S regardless of the magnitude of
the fixed ccst:
VE(Cartel)  - VE(RB(ES))  = (1 - 2/)(p'  - MCe) N > 0 X  3 < 2
2
This is because choosing the cartel over a bloc with S forces a transfer from consumers to the
producer whose we]Lfare  the government values more.  Finally, thi.s cartel is weakly preferred
to autarchy when:
VE(Cartel)  - VE(A)  = N[v(2N)  - v(N)]  - 1  --  F2>  0  (27) 203 
The cartel improves efficiency in the parameter  space to the right of (25) and to the left of
(27) in figure  7 since consumers enjoy a lower price as well as higher network benefits.  The
results are summarized in the following  proposition.
Proposition  5  There  exists  a range  of parameter  values v(.),  F',  N,  ,3  such  that  E  and  W
form  a cartel.  In  a part of this parameter  space, the cartel is trade-diverting  and insidious  in the
sense  that it makes  free trade more difficult  to achieve than  in its  absence.  However,  there also
exists  a parameter  space where  the  cartel is trade-creating  and thuts, is efficiency-improving.
152.2.2  Inter-country  transfer  payments
Now allow inter-country transfers to see if they will improve global efficiency.  In the benchmark
case without the possibility of cartel, there is a parameter space where S would like free trade
but the equilibrium outcome is A (see figure  6).  In the case that allows a cartel, there is an
area in which the inefficient  cartel deters free trade.  Do inter-country transfer payments reduce
these inefficiencies? The leader is left excessively  in autarchy because the governments of E
and W are reluctant  to allow S to compete their monopolies out of business. It  follows that
any transfers must be from S to the laggards in order to compensate for the loss of producer
surplus.
Let bFT  and bRB  be the maximum transfer payments that  the leader is willing to make to
achieve free trade  and  a regional bloc respectively, and tFT  (each) and  tRB  be the transfers
that  make E  and  W willing to enter free trade  and  a regional bloc with  S.  I continue to
denote the welfare of country i in trade regime j  before transfers as Vi(j)
If the  laggards  prefer autarchy  In order to achieve free trade, the leader is willing to pay
up to the welfare difference  between being in the free trade regime and in autarchy:
bFT <  VS(FT)  - VS(A)  =  (3 - 4!3)NAC  - (1 - 2/3)F  + ON[v(3N)  - v(N)]  (28)
where the first two terms on the right-hand-side are the producer surplus gain from consumer
base expansion net of profit margin reduction and the last term is the consumer surplus gain.
Government E  (W)  agrees to free trade  if it receives a transfer of:
tFT  >  VE(A)  - VE(FT)  =  (1 - 20)F  - 3N[v(3N)  - v(N)]
That is, if the transfer payment is large enough to compensate for the loss of producer surplus
net of gains in consumer surplus.  The outcome FT  is in the core only if transfer the leader
is willing to pay is larger than  what the two laggards require:
2 tFT<bFT  - 2 0  F  3__ 3  AC<[v(3N)  -v(N)]  (29)
For E  (W)  to agree to a regional bloc with S, the transfer necessary is:
tRB  > VE(A)  VE(RB(SE))  = (1 -2,3)F  -,N[v(2N)  -v(N)]  (30)
The leader is willing to pay up to:
bRB < VS(RB(SE))  - VS(A)  =  (2 - 30)NAC  - (1 - 2,3)F + 13N[v(2N)  - v(N)]  (31)
Therefore, regional bloc ES  or SW  will form only if:
bRB  ~~~1-2,3F  __2_3
bR>  tRB X  v(2N)-v(N)  >-  N  2  AC  (32)
The leader prefers free trade to a regional bloc with either partner if and only if:
VS(FT)  - bFT > VS(RB)  - bRB 4* bFT - bRB < (1 -/3)NAC  +  3N[v(3N)  - v(2N)]
Substituting  in the  equilibrium transfer payments which are the smallest values that  satisfy
(29) and  (32), this  inequality can be rewritten as:
v(3N)-v(2N)  >  123  -N-3[v(2N)  - v(N)]  - (,31/3)AC  (33)
16If  'laggards prefer  cartel  In the  parameter  space where the  laggards choose to  be in  a
cartel in the absence of transfers, the situation is complicated as it was in section 2.1.3. The
amounts the leader is willing to pay to achieve free trade  and to form a regional bloc axe the
same as  (23) and  (31) respectively.  Country E  (W)  weakly prefers transfer- inclusive free
trade  to cartel if it receives a transfer of at least:
tFl  > VE(Cartel)  - VE(FT)  = (1 - 2,3)FJ/2  - ,3N[(3N)  - v(2N[)]  (34)
Free trade will happen only if transfers the leader is willing to make are larger than the amount
that  will convince the two laggards to trade with S:
2t  FT  < bFTP  X  v(3N)  - v(2N) > 2-4  N  [v(2N) -4V(N)] - 3  - 4  C  (35)
3,3  N  3  3Lk/3  -vNI--  C  (5
For E  to agree to a,  regional bloc with S instead of a cartel, the transfer necessary is:
VE (RB)  + tRB  >  VE(Cartel)  X  tRB > (1 -- 2,3)  F  (36)
The leader weakly prefers free trade to a regional bloc if and only if:
VS(FT)  _ bFT > VS(RB)  - bRB X  bFT - bRB < (1-,3)NAC  + 3N[v(3A) - v(2N)]
Substituting  in  the  equilibrium values of bFT  and  blB,  which are the  smallest values that
satisfy  (35') and, (313)  (if any) respectively,
6f3  - 2  _- 3,  AC < [v(3N)  - v(2V)]  (37)
In the parameter  space where inequality  (37) does nct  hold but; the  leader is willing to pay
a transfer  large enough to induce one of the laggards to  prefer a bloc with tlhe leader to the
car7tel:
bRB> tRB  X  v(2N)  - v(N)  > I-2  F  2  C
,3  N  2,3
the situation  is analogous to section 2.1.3, and the core is empty.
These  results are summarized in the following proposition and illustrated  in figures  8a
and 8b.
Proposition  6  "hen  inter-country  transfers are alPowed,  the parameter space that results
in  an  inejfficient outcome is reduced.  There is a parameter space where the core is empty.
(i,l If  v(2N)  - v(N)  <  2 -AC  (figure  8a),  cartel between the  two laggards is  no  longer
in  the  core, and outcomes RB(SE)  and RB(WS)  are elements of the  core in  a subset of
the parameter space.  Both  of these regional blocs are more effcient  than  autarchy.  (ii)  If
v(2N)  - v(N)  > -2 3AC  (figure  8b),  there is a parameter space where the cartel persists,
and regional blocs involving S are never elements of the core. (iii) ifv(2N)-v(N)  = 2 3,8AC,
neither regional blocs nor the cartel are elements of the core.
172.2.3  Governments  choose  network
In all trading equilibria discussed above, consumers choose S whenever available. This made
governments of E  and W choose inefficient outcomes in an effort to protect their  monopolies
at  the expense of their consumers.  How would the outcome change if governments have the
power to choose  which technology is adopted as well as which countries to trade with instead of
having inter-country transfers possibilities? This describes a situation  where one (or more) of
the trading partners keeps its own domestic market closed to foreign competition while taking
advantage of the partner's  open market.
Benchmark:  no  transfers  and  no  cartel:  In  the  benchmark  case,  the  leader  weakly
prefers free trade  using the less advanced technology E  (W)  to autarchy  when
&3v(3N)  - v(N)I  > (1 - 203)-  + /AC  (38)
As long as S is reduced to using technology E  (W), it always prefers free trade  to a regional
bloc with E  (W).  Every country always welcomes others to join its network, but  free trade
using an inferior technology is even less attractive  to the other laggard,  W, than  that  using
the leader's technology. Therefore, free trade using E or W is not an element of the core if free
trade  was not the in the core in the benchmark case. In the parameter  space where free trade
using S is in the core, the governments of S and W (E) would not agree to use network E  (W).
So free trade  using an inferior technology is never an element of the core in the benchmark
case (without cartel possibility) even when governments can choose which network to use.
Is there a paramneter  space that  RB(ES)  or RB(SW)  using an inferior technology is in the
core? In the region where all countries stay in autarchy in the benchmark case, for S to want
to form a regional bloc with E  converting to E's  technology, the following must be the case:
v(2N)  - v(N)  >  2p  -3NF  + AC  (39)
That  is, the benefits of an expanded network net of the price increase must offset the loss of
producer surplus.  This must hold at  the same time as E wanting to be in autarchy:
v(3N)-v(N)  <  /3  *N  (40)
Inequalities (39) and  (40) cannot be satisfied at  the same time.  Therefore, the government's
ability to  choose the network to be adopted in the  trading area  (or close their  own markets
while taking advantage of the other open market(s)) does not make trade more likely to occur.
Cartel  allowed  (no  transfers):  In the case that  E  and W choose to  form a cartel  (i.e.:
(26) and (27) holds), S wants to join the EW  trading area by switching to the bloc's standard
if:
v(3N)  - v(N)  > AC  +  3  N  (41)
This can be satisfied at the same time as (26) and (27) when benefits of network externalities
are large compared to fixed costs and the difference  in production  efficiency:
v(2N)  - v(N)  > AC+  12/43  F  (42)
18Thi3 parameter  space is the triangle area above inequr6ity (41) and below (26) in figure  9.
In such a case, the size of the consumer base in the caitel gives it, an advantage of scale that
outweighs S's  technological superiority, and the world standardizes to  an inefficient system.
Aggregate consumer surplus in free trade  using an inefficient technology is higher than  when
S sl;ays in autarchy while E  and W form a cartel.
Proposition  7  There exists a range of parameter values v(.),  F, N,  3 such that the leader S
will accede  to the cartel EW,  switching to the (inefficient) network prevailing in the cartel.
When governments are more concerned about  thei:^  monopolies' profits than  consumers'
welfare, they  may choose not to  trade  with other countries, and thus  forego the benefits  of
network externalities.  A profit-sharing cartel improves welfare when it is trade-creating  but
worsens it when it is trade-diverting.  Inter-country  transfer  payments reduce inefficiencies.
Consumers are always better  off  when more countries are trading.  That is, when other countries
refuse to open their markets, consumers in a technologically advanced country are better  off
when their government opens the market unilaterally and adopts an inferior technology than
staying in autarchy and using a superior network, as long as the technological difference is not
huge (MC'  < ACS(3N)  assumption).
3  Conclusio:n
The difficulty with which accords were reached during the Uruguay Round of the GATT nego-
tiations illustrates that  trade liberalization is not an easily achieved goal. This paper proposes
the  installed base problem  associated with network externalities  as an example of why free
trade  may not prevail in multilateral  negotiations even when there  are clear gains from trade.
It farther suggests t.hat regionalism, at  least in this conltext,  is not a step in the right direction
but is an impediment to  achieving free trade.  Network externalities  are a salient feature  of
tecmnology  related  goods and  services. They are likely to influence the  bargaining positions
of governments in future rounds of trade  negotiations although government interventions do
not always make economic sense. International  transfer payments, which can take a form of
technical assistance as well as a pure monetary transfEr, can reduce inefficiencies  and should
be considered as an option particularly when there is a. clear technology leader.
For the ease of exposition,  this  paper  focuses on  relatively aarrow cases where there  is
a national  monopoly in each country and  the governnment  makes the  decision of whether  to
allow foreign technology into the domestic market, but the underlying issues are much broader.
Empirical evidence is rather  scant  so far,  and it is an interesting  and important  area to  be
explored in the future research.
19References
[11  Baldwin, Richard. 1995. "A domino theory of regionalism", in Baldwin, R., P. Haaparanta,
and J. Kiander, edd. Expanding membership in the European  Union. Cambridge:  Cam-
bridge University Press. pp25-48.
[2] Bensen, Stanley and Joseph Farrell. 1994. Choosing how to compete: strategies and tactics
in standardization.  Journal  of Economic Perspectives. vol. 8, no. 2.
[3] Bhagwati,  Jagdish.  1991. Political  economy and international  economics. Cambridge,
Massachusetts:  MIT Press.
[4]  …  …  and  Arvind Panagariya.  1996. "Preferential trading  areas  and  multilat;-
eralism - strangers,  friends, or foes?"  in Bhagwati, J.N.  and A  Panagariya,  edd.  The
Economics  of Preferential  Trade Agreements.  Washington,  D.C.:  The  AEI  Press.
[5] Bhattari,  Keshab and John Whalley. 1998. mimeo.
[6] Burbidge, John et al. 1997.  A coalition-formation approach to equilibrium federations and
trading blocs. American Economic Review. Vol. 87, No. 5.
[7] Choi, Jay  Pil and  Marcel Thum.  1998. Market  structure  and  the timing  of technology
adoption with network externalities. European Economic Review. vol. 42.
[8] Ethier,  Wilfred. 1998. Regionalism in a multilateral world. Forthcoming, Journal  of Po-
litical Economy.
[9] Farrell, Joseph  and  Garth  Saloner. 1986. Installed  base and  compatibility:  innovation,
product  preannouncements, and predation. American Economic Review. vol. 76, no. 5.
[10] Gandal, Neil and Oz Shy. 2000. Journal of International Economics forthcoming.
[11] Hoekman, Bernard. 1996. In Martin, Will and Alan Winters edd.,  The  Uruguay Round
and the  developing  countries.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press.
[12]  and Pierre  Sauve. 1994. Liberalizing trade  in services. World Bank discus-
sion papers. no. 243. Washington, D.C.: The International  Bank for Reconstruction  and
Development.
[13] Katz, Michael and Carl Shapiro. 1985. Network externalities, competition, and compati-
bility. American Economic Review. vol. 75, no.3.
[14]  . ..  1986.  Technology adoption in the presence of network externalities. Journal
of Political Economy. vol. 94, no. 4.
[15]  -_-  -_  . 1994.  Systems  competition  and  network  effects.  Journal  of Economic  Pe.-
spectives. vol. 8, no. 2.
[16] Kemp and Wan. 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs
unions." Reprinted  in Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed. International  Trade:  Selected Readings.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 377-80.
20[17] Krishna, Kala. 1987. High tech trade policy. NBER working paper #2182.
[18] Levy, IPhilip. 1997.  A political-economic  analysis of free-trade agreements. American Eco-
nomic Review. vol. 87, no. 4.
[19] Liebowitz, S and Stephen Margolis. 1990.  The fable of keys. Journal of Lawv  & Economics.
vol. 33.
[20  McLaren, John.  1999. A theory of insidious regionalism. Columbia University mimeo.
[21' Riezman, Rayimond. 1985. Customs unions and the  core. Journal  of International  Eco-
nomics. vol. 19.
[221  Stewart,  Tererice. ed. 1993. The GATT  Uruguay Round  - a negotiating history (1986-
1992). Vol II. Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers
[23] Summers, Lawvrence.  1991. "Regionalism and  the world trading  system.'  in Policy im-
plications of trade and currency zones. Kansas CAty,  Missouri: Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City.
[24] Sykes, Alan. 1995. Product standards for internationally integrated goods markets. Wash-
ington, D.C.:  The Brookings Institution.
[25] Telser, Lester. 1994. The usefulness of core theory in economics. Journal  of Economic
Perspectives. vol. 8, no.2.
[261  World Trade Organization. 1998. Annual Report.  International trade statistics.  Geneva:
WTO.
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